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Abstract: In Re D is the most recent in a line of cases to have raised problems 
with the determination of legal fatherhood under s.28(3) of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990). The judgment is 
interesting in particular as a demonstration of the growing currency 
of the idea that a child has a right to ‘genetic truth’ and for further 
evidencing a ‘fragmentation of fatherhood’. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reproductive technologies have a well-documented potential to confuse and 
disrupt our understandings of parenthood (Stanworth, 1987; Arditti, Duelli Klein 
and Minden, 1984; Katz Rothman, 1990; Shultz, 1990; Dolgin, 1994; Sheldon, 
2005).  As Lord Hope has recently put it ‘[t]he widening of the frontiers of human 
existence by the use of assisted reproduction technologies has raised new 
questions about how the relationships that result from their use are to be 
identified’.1   Perhaps unsurprisingly, the legal attempt to provide answers to such 
questions has not proved straightforward.   Whilst the law has settled on defining 
motherhood with reference to the gestational link,2 determining who should be 
considered a child’s legal father has proved a rather more complex and tortured 
exercise which continues to throw up novel problems for legal determination.  This 
serves to illustrate an interesting and more general tension in the law regulating 
fatherhood, as to precisely what factor/s should ground that status.  Is the relevant 
factor a genetic link (as, for example, in child support liability), a marital one (as in 
the presumption, pater is est quern nuptiae demonstrant), consideration of whether 
a man intended to create a child (as can perhaps be most clearly in s. 28 of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), or is it essentially social fatherhood 
                                                 
1
 Per Lord Hope at para [5]. 
 
2
 See s. 27 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990). 
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(as recognised when paternal rights and responsibilities are awarded on the basis 
of proven commitment to a child in contact and parental responsibility orders)?   
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) (the 1990 Act) represented a 
concerted attempt to contain some of the confusion created by reproductive 
technologies through an imposition of traditional understandings of parenthood 
onto the novel reproductive scenarios which the technologies made possible.3  The 
Act reflected more than anything a desire to protect a particular model of parenting, 
notably that of ‘heterosexual, preferably married, parents’ (Dewar, 1998: 482).  
This desire is nowhere clearer than in the ‘status provisions’, ss. 27-9, which set 
out who should be considered the legal mother and father of a child born from the 
use of those reproductive technologies regulated by the 1990 Act.  Yet the drafters 
of 1990 Act would have been naïve had they ever dreamt that they were providing 
the last word on these questions.  To offer just a few examples of the numerous 
difficult questions which have come before the courts since 1990:  can a man be 
recognised as a father if he dies before an embryo is created or implanted or 
before ‘his’ child is born?4   Must one have been born a man to be legally 
recognised as a father, or may a female to male transsexual be so recognised?5   
If a couple make use of a treatment, intending to use only their own gametes, but 
the woman’s egg is mistakenly fertilised by the wrong man’s sperm, who should be 
recognised as the legal father: the husband with whom she sought treatment or the 
genetic father whose sperm was mistakenly used?6  The case of In Re D, which 
has recently wended its way through the courts to arrive in the House of Lords, 




Both the facts and the trajectory of In Re D through the courts are complex.8  Ms D 
and Mr B sought infertility treatment services together, at that stage having enjoyed 
a relationship of four years.  Following three appointments for counselling, the first 
                                                 
3
 The 1990 Act establishes a regulatory regime, overseen by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA), for embryo research and for those infertility treatment services which involve creation 
of embryos outside of a woman’s body and/or use of any gametes other than her own and those of her 
partner.   
 
4
 High Court (1 March 2003) (unreported), challenging s.28(6)(b) of the 1990 Act.    
 
5
 On this latter possibility see the Gender Recognition Act 2004 which allows for female to male 
transsexuals to be recognised as fathers in some circumstances.  This had been previously 
impossible in the UK, see: X, Y and Z v the UK (1997) 24 EHHR 143.  
 
6
 The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD). 
 
7
 The case changes its name several times as it proceeds through the courts.  For ease of 
reference, I will refer to it using the name by which it was known in the House of Lords, In Re D, in 




  I rely here on the useful summary offered by Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, see paras 27 to 33. 
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taking place in April 1995, they were approved for treatment in March 1996. They 
eventually signed consent forms in November 1996 and January 1997.  The form 
signed by Mr B (headed ‘male partner’s acknowledgment’) stated:  
 
‘I am not married to [D] but I acknowledge that she and I are being treated together, and 
that I intend to become the legal father of any resulting child’.   
 
The first stage of treatment took place during 1997 and involved three attempts at 
artificial insemination with donor sperm, all of which were unsuccessful.  In August 
1998, Mr B signed a further form, again giving his consent in substantially the 
same terms.  In October 1998, at least twelve eggs were harvested from Ms D and 
fertilised with donor sperm.  The first implantation failed and, by mid-March 1999, 
Mr B and Ms D had separated.  After this separation, in May 1999, a second 
implantation (using some of the remaining stored embryos) took place.  By this 
time, Ms D was with a new partner, Mr S, who attended the clinic with her.  On a 
form which she signed in May 1999, Ms D left the partner’s name blank.  This time, 
the implantation was successful and Ms D gave birth to a daughter, R, in February 
2000.  The clinic was not informed that Ms D and Mr B had separated until 
September 1999. 
 
On hearing that Ms D had given birth, Mr B promptly made an application in the 
County Court for contact and parental responsibility orders.  In the first instance 
hearing, all parties conceded that Mr B was R’s legal father, thus accepting that the 
Court had the jurisdiction to make the orders requested.  Not called on to find on 
the issue of paternity, Judge Hedley ordered indirect contact and for Mr B to be 
given photographs of R, reasoning that he would be an important stabilizing 
member of her family.9  He adjourned Mr B’s application for parental responsibility, 
noting that this was likely to be granted if he maintained his commitment to indirect 
contact for the next couple of years.  Mr B was to be treated as the father for all 
purposes, being in the same position as a natural father, despite the lack of any 
biological link with R.  
 
Ms D applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the contact order.10   
Permission was refused, with the Court of Appeal commending Judge Hedley on 
the fact that he:  
 
rightly took the view that the fact of biological parentage could be relevant to the welfare of a 
child … [and] that it was beneficial to the child that there should be a potential relationship with 
the man deemed to be the child’s father because he had more confidence that the father would 
be able to deal in due course with the delicate issue of the circumstances of her conception and 
birth than the mother. 11  
 
                                                 
9
 In this case, ‘indirect contact’ was to mean that the father could send R a ‘modest’ present at 
Christmas and birthdays, and easter egg and card and one letter during the summer.  In return, he 
would receive two photos of R per year (Chrisafis, 2001).  
 
10
 In the Matter of D (A Child) [2001] EWCA, [2001] Fam Law 504, [2001] 1 FLR 972. 
 
11
 Re D [2001] above n 78, per Hale LJ at [38]. 
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However, obiter dicta, the Court of Appeal also expressed concern about the 
concession of jurisdiction.  The case was thus returned to Hedley J (as he had 
then become).  He directed that the issue of paternity should be heard as a 
preliminary issue, which he duly decided in favour of Mr B, making a declaration of 
paternity.12   However, Ms D then successfully appealed on the issue of paternity, 
with the Court of Appeal finding that Mr B could not be considered the legal father 
under the 1990 Act and, as such, that R would be legally fatherless.  This, 
however, did not affect Judge Hedley’s earlier ruling regarding contact.  Mr B then 
appealed to the House of Lords, claiming that the Court of Appeal had been wrong 
to fail to recognise him as R’s legal father.   In a unanimous judgment, five Law 




At the heart of this case is a close consideration of s. 28 of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (1990).    
 
s.28 Meaning of ‘father’ 
 
(1) This section applies in the case of a child who is being or has been carried by a woman 
as the result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs or her artificial 
insemination. 
 
(2) If –  
 
(a) at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of the 
insemination, the woman was a party to a marriage … 
 
then … the other party to the marriage shall be treated as the father of the child 
unless it is shown that he did not consent to the placing in her of the embryo or 
the sperm and eggs or to her insemination (as the case may be). 
 
(3) If no man is treated, by virtue of subsection (2) above, as the father of the child but –  
 
(a) the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in the woman, or she was 
artificially inseminated, in the course of treatment services provided for her and 
a man together … 
 
then … that man shall be treated as the father of the child. 
 
This elaborate legal designation of father is substantially more complicated than 
that of motherhood and might, in itself, be taken as suggesting an attempt to 
contain the perceived disruptive potential of reproductive technologies in relation to 
paternity, legitimacy and contact rights (Steinberg, 1997: 181). In section 28(2), the 
Act preserves a privileged place for marriage as the preferred way of attributing 
                                                 
12
 B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843. 
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paternity.  However, if no father exists by virtue of s.28(2), an unmarried man will 
be deemed the legal father under s.28(3) where treatment services were provided 
for him and the woman together.  Unmarried male partners can thus gain the same 
parental rights as married men, though without the presumption of consent that 
occurs in marriage.   The dense language of the provision suggests an attempt to 
think through the various complex possibilities raised by RTs and, in each potential 
factual situation, to allocate fatherhood status in such a way as to most clearly 
approximate the nuclear family, ‘[t]he definition of paternity … [reflecting] more 
than anything, the type of parents whom the state is prepared to reproduce through 
the provision of fertility services: namely, the two parent, heterosexual, preferably 
married, parents’ (Dewar, 1998: 482).     
 
As Ms D and Mr B were unmarried, s.28(2) clearly had no application here and the 
House of Lords were called upon to apply s. 28(3).  They faced two specific 
problems.  First, what does the expression of obtaining treatment services 
‘together’ mean in a context where a woman is inseminated using donor sperm 
and the infertile man does not himself receive any ‘positive’ treatment of any 
kind?13  Secondly, and most pointedly, the case also raises the issue of timing.  
Given that infertility treatment services may be a long and protracted process (in 
this case stretching over six years), at what moment must the issue of whether 
treatment was provided for the couple ‘together’ be judged?   
 
In responding to the first of these questions, the House of Lords follows an 
established line of jurisprudence in finding that what is meant by treatment together 
is that the couple shared a joint enterprise to create a child.14  On the second, 
more difficult, question the House of Lords adopted the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeal, where Hale LJ had suggested that for the man to be considered the legal 
father under s.28(3), the couple must be receiving treatment together at the 
moment when the embryo is implanted into the woman.  Whether or not this is the 
case is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of an examination of all the 
evidence and looking at the issue from the perspective of all parties involved.15  In 
this case, where the relationship had clearly ended before the successful 
implantation took place, the couple no longer shared a joint enterprise to create a 
child and could not be considered to be obtaining treatment services together at 
that time.  
                                                 
13
 The Court appears to use the phrase ‘positive’ treatment to mean medical treatment actually 
received on the man’s own body.   
14
 In Re B (Parentage) [1996] 2 FLR 15, the Court found that the correct understanding of s.28(3) 
requirement that treatment be provided for a man and woman ‘together’ was to require a ‘joint 
enterprise’.  This understanding has been followed in:  U v W [1997] 2 FLR 282, Re R (Contact: 
HFEA) (2001) 1 FLR 247, The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others 
[2003] EWCA 259 (QBD).  See however the different understanding in Re Q (Parental Order) 
[1996] 1 FLR 369, where the Court held that ‘treatment together’ required that both parties actually 




 Here the House of Lords would appear to be responding to an argument made by Craig Lind, that 
the important factor is the perspective of the Clinic administering treatment, given the test is not that 
treatment be received by a man and woman together, but rather that it be provided for them 
together.   The House of Lords’ determination is that the perspective of both clinic and clients are all 
matters which must be included as relevant evidence in the determination of fact. 
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Given the courts’ previous jurisprudence on s.28(3), the decision to deny legal 
fatherhood to Mr B is a natural one.16  Indeed, what might seem more interesting is 
the appeal courts’ refusal to interfere with the lower court’s ruling on contact. In a 
case where Mr B has no genetic link with the child and was no longer in a 
relationship with the mother at a time when implantation took place, on what basis 
should he be accorded these legal rights?  A number of comments may be made 
in response to this question, but first it is worth pausing to consider why it is that Mr 
B should seek to assert rights with regard to a child who he has never met, who is 
no genetic relative, and when he has no ongoing relationship with her mother.   
 
While attempting to fathom the motivation of a litigant is inevitably a speculative 
exercise, it is worth noting here a perceived sea change whereby men are 
increasingly asserting rights with regard to their children, rather than seeking to 
evade responsibilities with regard to them.   This is particularly clear at the level of 
media reporting: while the newspapers of the 1980s were full of discussion of child 
support liability and criticism of those ‘deadbeat dads’ who sought to avoid it, now it 
is much more common to read about the activities of fathers’ rights activists 
protesting their lack of access to their children.17  In Re D provides another 
interesting example of a man fighting to establish his rights to be recognised as a 
father, rather than seeking to avoid his (financial) responsibilities as such.  The 
account which B gave to a journalist of his motivation for bringing this action is a 
touching account of a man desperate to have a relationship with a child who he 
deeply believes to be his own.  
 
‘[R] is my daughter totally and completely.  As a man, when you choose to have a child by 
anonymous donor, they check your height, build, blood group, eye colour and appearance 
to match the donor with the person.  So when the child is born it will have the 
characteristics of both the father and the mother.  It will look like both.  A child is not a 
product of one person, but of two. 
 
I wasn’t surprised by the Court of Appeal’s decision.  I hoped parental responsibility would 
be given, but I’ve learnt to expect nothing and to be patient.  That way you don’t get 
disappointed.  I am sad that I will miss out on all the firsts – teething and first steps.  But [R] 
is our child for life and I just have to prepare for the input I will have in the future.  I never 
expected media attention from the case, nor did I think I was a champion of fathers’ rights 
... I have never spoken out as part of a legal crusade.  I have simply loved [R] from the 
moment I heard she was born.  And I save all the press cuttings and record all the 
television coverage so that when [R] grows up, she can see how much I love her.’ 
(Christalis, 2001)   
 
What exactly it is that B believes grounds his paternal status in this case escapes 
an exact articulation but might, perhaps, be best captured by Thomas Laqueur’s 
(1990) suggestion that  fatherhood is grounded in a man’s ‘emotional investment’ 
in a child.  
 
                                                 
16
 In one of the few published commentaries on the Court of Appeal decision in this case, Criag 
Lind has strongly argued in favour of Mr B’s right to be recognised as the legal father under s. 
28(3).  While I have no space here fully to engage with his arguments  …  
 
17
 Refs  
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But however poignant the above statement, Mr B’s evident emotional investment in 
R does not provide a basis for legal rights, which are grounded in the more 
mundane and concrete realities of genetic and marital links, demonstrated 
intention to create a child or evidenced commitment and social parenting.18  As 
such, while the courts’ reading of s.28(3) lead them to refuse Mr B the status of 
legal father, why do they choose to accord him other paternal rights, such as 
indirect contact, with a possibility of parental responsibility in the future?   A 
number of explanations may be suggested here. 
 
First, In Re D demonstrates the weight attached to genetic factors and the growing 
currency of a ‘right to genetic truth’.   This locates the case within a range of other 
developments suggesting a growing recognition of the interests of children born by 
donor insemination (DI) to know the identity of their genetic fathers, and which is 
supported by a clear trend in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.19  Recently, following much popular debate, media interest and public 
consultation, the Government has announced a change in the law: on reaching the 
age of eighteen, children born as a result of sperm, eggs or embryos donated after 
April 2005 will acquire the right to know the identity of the gamete donors.20   In the 
present case, though, where the courts are not concerned with the relationship 
between R and her genetic father, the significance of genetics does not play out in 
any straightforward way.  The relevance of genetics is particularly clear in the first 
instance judgment, where Judge Hedley directed himself that, inter alia, the 
following is significant: 
 
‘… this child is likely to encounter serious issues in understanding her background and for 
that will be dependent on a mother in whom I do not have confidence to face up to those 
issues; I think there is a real risk that the issue will be shelved and even that the child will 
initially, at least, be misled.  … [T]here is no basis on which this child could understand who 
Mr B was or why he was being introduced into her life and, whilst that is sometimes an 
issue with a putative father, it is exacerbated in this case by the unusual biological 
background.  … I am satisfied that Mr B is genuine in his desire for contact and parental 
                                                 
18
 Craig Lind criticises the Court of Appeal decision for ‘fl[ying] in the face of progress that has been 
made towards the institutionalisation of social parenthood.’ (340). I find it difficult to agree.   To 
recognise Mr B as the legal father would, if anything, be to apply an intentional test of parent.  As 
yet, he is not present in the child’s life as a social parent (though clearly he wishes to be so).  His 
claims are based on his intention to create a child and/or his emotional investment in the child, R, 
who has now been born.  But ‘caring about’ is not the same as ‘caring for’, and the recognition of 
social parenting should be rooted in the latter not the former.   See Carol Smart //, and Sara 
Ruddick’s (1990) response to Laqueur (1990). 
 
19
 Mikulić v. Croatia (Application no. 53176/99) (7 February 2002), Odièvre v. France (Application 
no. 42326/98) (13 February 2003).  Despite the gender neutral framing of the Government 
consultation on gamete donation, public debate has typically focussed on the right to trace sperm 
donors.  Of course this is partly because sperm donation is far more common than egg donation, 
but it is also possible that it is because we tend to think about fatherhood more as a genetic 
relationship and motherhood as a gestational and/or caring one.  In this regard, note the different 
connotations of the verbs ‘to father’ and ‘to mother’ a child.   
20
 See www.doh.gov.uk/consultations , www.doh.gov.uk/gametedonors/document.htm , Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004.  The 
regulations, approved without a vote, do not have retrospective application.   
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responsibility and may well have an important role in helping the child to come to terms with 
her origins….’21  
 
While Mr B does not share a genetic link with R, he can still claim some limited 
rights because of the role he can play in explaining her genetic origins.  Unusually, 
then, a focus on the importance of genetics leads to the granting of rights not to a 
genetic father, but to someone who is thought to be well placed to communicate 
important genetic information. 
 
Secondly, the courts clearly take a dim view of D’s actions.  Not only had she 
deliberately misled the clinic, she was also forced to admit that she had lied to the 
court about when she had first told her doctor about end of relationship and was 
found to be ‘a wholly unreliable witness’.22  Speculatively, it might appear that the 
granting of rights to B might thus be seen as a way of imposing appropriate and 
responsible (male) control over her, the need for such control being further 
mandated by her mental and emotional fragility (characteristics never likely to help 
female defendants succeed in court) (Wallbank, 2004: 257).  The fact that the 
durability of the mother’s relationship with Mr S cannot be proven, might be 
understood not just in terms of a lack of a suitable father figure for R but also as 
leaving Ms D without a man to rein in her excesses.  
 
Are the courts right to be critical of Ms D?  Without knowing more than the limited 
facts provided in the law reports, it is difficult to know whether we should share 
their evident disapproval.  While it seems clear that Ms D deliberately misled the 
clinic as to the state of her relationship with Mr B and then lied in court as to the 
chronology of some of the events described above, these actions do need to be 
located in a specific context where it is known to be difficult for a single woman to 
obtain infertility treatment services.  Would Ms D still have acted this way, were her 
access to infertility treatment services not dependent on the need to comply with 
the terms of the 1990 Act and, specifically, the requirement in s. 13(5) that the 
clinic take account of the welfare of the child, including that child’s need for a 
father?  It is generally accepted that had she been honest about the breakdown in 
this relationship, Ms D’s treatment would have been further delayed, if not 
suspended altogether.  What might reasonably be expected of a woman in this 
context who is desperate for a child?  Ms D may not have acted well, but it is the 
legal requirements imposed in s.13(5) – requirements which have been attacked 
even by the Chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority as 
discriminatory and ‘anachronistic’ – which provided the framework within which she 
acted badly (see Blackstock, 2004). If these circumstances do not excuse her 
conduct, they must at least provide the context within which it should be judged.   
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, In Re D provides further evidence of what, 
drawing on Smart and Neale (1999), I have elsewhere described as a 
fragmentation of fatherhood. This is an important sociological fact.  Following the 
breakdown of a relationship, children are overwhelmingly likely to continue to live 
with their genetic mother. Men who do retain parental roles and responsibilities will 
                                                 
21
 At 250. 
 
22
 Per Judge Hedley at 250. 
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thus do so whilst living in a different household, possibly sharing the role of social 
father with the mother’s new partner (Smart and Neale, 1999; MacLean and 
Richards; Simpson, 1998).23  The fragmentation of families is thus above all a 
fragmentation of fatherhood, where paternal status, rights, responsibilities and 
roles can be shared between two or more men.   
 
This sub-division of fatherhood is in evidence across family law, which has 
developed a range of flexible concepts which aid the sharing of parental rights and 
responsibilities.  And while these concepts are often gender neutral, as noted 
above, the social reality with which they interact is clearly not.24  The broad issue 
of fatherhood is broken down into a series of narrower legal questions such as: who 
should be named on the birth certificate; who should enjoy contact rights and 
parental responsibility; and who should be liable financially to maintain the child? 
Modern family law has made very clear that the same man’s name need not be 
given in answer to every question.25   What is noteworthy in the decisions made by 
the various courts in In Re D, is an acceptance that such a fragmentation should 
also apply in the context of reproductive technologies, notwithstanding the 1990 
Act’s attempt to legislate for a nuclear family norm where all parental duties are 
shared by one mother and one father.   Specifically, it should be noted that in this 
case, no court appears overly concerned by the possibility that introducing Mr B 
into R’s life is liable to cause confusion or to disrupt the family unit which her 
mother claims to be building with Mr S.   Judge Hedley does note that the 
disappearance of Mr S, leaving the child without a social father, might strengthen 
Mr B’s case for direct contact and that he is not convinced by the adequacy of S as 
a father figure.  But beyond this, the judge’s desire to foster contact between Mr B 
and R suggests that the existence of more than one party with a desire to share in 
fathering a child is not necessarily a bad thing.    The judge assumes that at least 
one man must be present in a fathering role and he is not persuaded that Mr S will 
be so ‘indefinitely’. As such, Mr B’s claim for a greater presence in R’s life would be 
strengthened by the absence of Mr S.  Significantly, however, the presence of Mr S 
does not serve as a bar to B’s involvement. And the benefits gained by a child 





In refusing Mr B the status of legal father, the appeal courts have reached a ruling 
on the issue of legal fatherhood which fits closely with earlier precedent on s. 28(3) 
                                                 
23
  According to the last census, 87% of step-families involve households made up of a couple with 
children from the woman’s previous relationship, 11% have children from the man’s previous 




 It should be noted, of course, that not all of the concepts are gender neutral: e.g. differences 
clearly apply with regard to birth registration and the granting of parental responsibility.   
 
25
 See some examples discussed in Sheldon (2005, //). 
 
26
  The courts’ ruling here is clearly in line with an existing line of jurisprudence regarding contact 
and parental responsibility orders.  See Sheldon (2005)  nn 22-6 and accompanying text. 
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as requiring an ongoing ‘joint enterprise’.  Further, it seems likely that a tightening 
of consent procedures make it less likely that a similar case will occur in the 
future.27   But what of the granting of indirect contact rights to Mr B, with a view to a 
possible granting of parental responsibility in the future?   The judgments in In Re 
D show the courts thinking about R’s best interests and recognising that a number 
of adults may play important roles in her life.  Such a starting point for analysis 
might seem to fit with the recommendations of those who have argued for the need 
to focus on family practices rather than the status of residing within a pre-given 
structure: on 'doing' rather than 'being' family (Morgan, 1996, 1999).  The legal 
response to the facts of In Re D is a flexible one which accords specific rights on the 
basis of a child’s perceived best interests.  Within this vision, the fact that a man is 
named on a birth certificate is seen as less important than giving him some role in a 
child’s life as a provider of information and possible future social father.  However, 
the reality of this case is the recognition of paternal interests with regard to a man 
who has no genetic links with a child, no existing social relationship with her, and 
no ongoing relationship with her mother.  What impact will this have on the family 
unit which Ms D aims to build for R?   In this sense, In Re D might also be located 
as one in a line of cases which shows more men acquiring more parental rights at 
a time when these same rights are routinely denied to others, most notably lesbian 
non-gestational mothers (see Sheldon, 2005).28   
 
In Re D is best understood as part of the law’s ongoing attempts to negotiate the 
current reality of fragmented families and consequent proliferation of men who may 
share an interest in parenting any given child.   While the sub-division of 
parenthood offered by reproductive technologies (Shultz, Dolgin, Sheldon) may 
pose such dilemmas in a particularly stark way, the fragmentation of fatherhood 
involved in everyday family breakdown means that this is part of a broader social 
reality.  Given the complexities of the social realities to be regulated, there is no 
doubt that equally difficult problems will arise in the future.   And the legal solutions 
look set to be as complex and multi-faceted as the messy realities of people’s lives 
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